Author: Robert Walker, contact email robert@robertinventor.com

Why I’m asking NASA to re-examine plans for its Mars sample return mission - like asking an architect to install a smoke detector - remote chance of house fire - but a house of billions of people - and at some point for sure they will have to do it

I do voluntary work to help scared people over the internet and it is very important for me to present this responsibly to vulnerable people. So here is my message

Margaret Race, a biologist working on planetary protection and Mars sample return for the SETI Institute and specialist in environmental impact analysis used the analogy of a smoke detector in response to similar non-peer-reviewed suggestions by the space colonization enthusiast and leader of the Mars Society Robert Zubrin:

If he were an architect, would he suggest designing buildings without smoke detectors or fire extinguishers?

Hazardous Until Proven Otherwise, in: "Opinion: No Threat? No Way",

Hand installing smoke detector labelled “NASA” and wooden ceiling of a house labelled “Earth”

(Smoke detector graphic from The EnergySmart Academy)

I am doing all this to get NASA to install a smoke detector but one that I think is exceptionally important despite the low risk, because Earth’s biosphere is a “house” with billions of people in it.

Also the potential for present day life in samples returned from Jezero crater is likely low. But in other areas of Mars there are sites with much higher potential for present day life. There may also be patchy life in Jezero crater in microhabitats that would eventually be returned with enough sample return missions. So NASA’s EIS is important as a precedent.

TITLES OF SECTIONS ARE LIKE MINI ABSTRACTS

The title of each section also summarizes its main conclusions similarly to an abstract. You can get a good first idea by just reading the titles of sections - and looking at any graphics. Hover your mouse over the left margin of the page to see a floating menu of all the section titles.

I use hyperlinked inline citations in this open letter consisting of the title in brackets hyperlinked to the paper and then the page number after the title like this: (Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations (1997) : pages 6 - 7)

ALL STUDIES SAY THE POTENTIAL FOR LARGE-SCALE HARM APPEARS TO BE LOW

I’d like to emphasize all studies say the potential for large-scale harm to the environment or human health from escape of Martian life appears to be low. This is the most recent mars sample return study from 2012 by the European Space Foundation (ESF):

The Study Group also concurs with another conclusion from the NRC reports (1997, 2009) that the potential for large-scale effects on the Earth’s biosphere by a returned Mars life form appears to be low, but is not demonstrably zero.

(Mars Sample Return backward contamination–Strategic advice and requirements : 28)

Then the chance there is life in these samples is also considered to be low. The iMOST team that NASA assembled to advise them on the science experiments for the returned samples put it like this:

The probability of discovering extant life at the Martian surface (including by means of MSR [Mars Sample Return) is generally considered to be low. However, its discovery would be so profound that it would shake the pillars of science. It would yield insight into the very fundamentals of life such as what are the basic universal properties of living systems … and how life evolves

(The potential science and engineering value of samples delivered to Earth by Mars sample return: International MSR Objectives and Samples Team (iMOST) : Page 86)

House fires are also exceptionally unlikely. Very few houses burn down. The main difference is this is a house for a billion people. We have to be exceptionally sure that our smoke detector is functioning, tested, has batteries installed etc in this analogy.

NASA DID TRY TO INSTALL A SMOKE DETECTOR - BUT WERE HANDICAPPED BECAUSE THEY CLOSED DOWN THE DEPARTMENT THAT KNOWS HOW TO INSTALL SMOKE DETECTORS (THE PLANETARY PROTECTION OFFICE) AND THEY SHUT OUT THE INSPECTORS WHO WOULD LOOK AT IT TO CHECK IT’S WORKING (OTHER AGENCIES)

This is what I didn’t see in this report. I saw a box that looks like a smoke detector but doesn’t really function and doesn’t match modern design requirements for a smoke detector. We have to fix that.

I was very puzzled as they have, or had, a great deal of expertise in planetary protection. I never expected anything like this.

They made numerous mistakes. They also reinforced reasoning that seems plausible - and is widely believed amongst space colonization enthusiast but doesn’t stand up to scrutiny and is refuted multiple times in the literature.

But then I found that they closed down the planetary protection office and they aren’t really doing planetary protection any more as it used to be understood. So I guess they no longer have anyone there who does this sort of work.

In the analogy it’s a bit like builder building houses that no longer has anyone who knows how to install a smoke alarm.

So that’s why I’m doing this. In this extended metaphor, I’m trying to get them to talk to experts who know how to install smoke alarms and do it properly.

The inspectors are still there, and the experts who know how to install smoke alarms are still there and NASA just needs to start talking to them. If they don’t then at some point they will have to, as the public realizes what happened, because their mission is only possible long term with support of the general public.

SOME SCIENTISTS CARE GREATLY ABOUT PLANETARY PROTECTION

There are some scientists who care greatly about planetary protection. These include the pioneers of planetary protection, Joshua Lederberg and Carl Sagan (When Biospheres Collide : 35, 424).

They had great enthusiasm for the science and a passion for space exploration. However, they also cared deeply about Earth’s biosphere and its people to the extent that they are not willing to take even a minute risk with the lives of a billion people no matter how much the science return.

Carl Sagan is one of my heroes and I have the same focus as him in this respect. Enthusiastic about space science. Keen on space exploration, including both robotic and human exploration. Watched the Apollo landings in amazement in the 1960s; I was an Apollo era kid. Marvelled at the Voyager “grand tour” of the solar system. But I also greatly value Earth’s biosphere and its inhabitants.

For me, the value of Earth and its inhabitants is essentially infinite.

Text on graphic: Carl Sagan (pioneer in planetary protection - first paper in 1960)
[his first paper is (Biological contamination of the Moon)]

“I, myself, would love to be involved in the first manned expedition to Mars. But an exhaustive program of unmanned biological exploration of Mars is necessary first.

“The likelihood that such pathogens exist is probably small, but we cannot take even a small risk with a billion lives.”

[quote from: (The Cosmic Connection – an Extraterrestrial Perspective)]
[I provide text captions for the graphics in this open latter for visually impaired readers]

NASA DID SHUT DOWN ITS INTERAGENCY PANEL IN 2006, BUT THIS IS NOT GOING TO WORK LONG TERM - NUMEROUS AGENCIES WILL GET INVOLVED TO MAKE SURE THEIR PLANS ARE SAFE FOR EARTH - EITHER NOW OR LATER IF THEY DON’T NOTICE THE EIS

NASA has closed down their interagency panel, against the advice of all the previous Mars sample return studies. They are trying to do this without any approval from other agencies or even internal oversight within NASA from independent planetary protection experts.

It is only a question of when other agencies notice how inadequate their plans are. I don’t know if NASA will be able to get their EIS through NEPA without them noticing it.

But at some point, numerous US agencies will make sure NASA’s plans are safe - agencies who have nothing invested in the success of the space program - including the

Department of Homeland Security,
CDC (for potential impact on human health),
Department of Agriculture (for potential impact on livestock and crops),
Occupational Safety and Health Administration - for any rules about quarantine for technicians working at the facility
Department of the Interior which is the steward for public land and wild animals which could be affected by release of Martian microbes
Fish and Wildlife Service for the DoI who maintain an invasive species containment program and may see back contamination as a possible source of invasive species
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)'s fishery program for sea landing in case it could affect marine life and NOAA fisheries
Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN)

The space lobby is very strong. But so also is the lobby of

farmers
fishermen
public health

etc. The next step after the EIS is the presidential directive NSC-25, which requires the president to order a review of any action that may large scale effects. It has to be done even if the agency feels confident such allegations are false (Presidential Directive NSC-25: Scientific or Technological Experiments with Possible Large-Scale Adverse Environmental Effects and Launch of Nuclear Systems into Space)

If it still doesn’t get enough attention in the presidential directive - then the plans will get intense scrutiny from the public in the lead up to the sample return in 2033.

If it comes to Congress and NASA’s plans remain as inadequate as they are today - a bill in Congress to stop it would be sure to succeed. There is no way the space lobby would win the day in Congress if the plans are not adequate to protect Earth.

This is what would surely happen to the samples once public attention and scientific attention shows that NASA has no realistic plan to protect Earth, possibly realizing this only in 2033 when the samples are already on their way back to Earth.

The space enthusiasts lobby is powerful but so also are the farmers, the Audobon society, the CDC, the Department of Agriculture and if it comes to a vote in Congress, those strongly in support of a Mars sample return to the extent space enthusiasts are will be a small minority.

Text on graphic: Worst case for NASA, samples have to fly past Earth in 2033 without landing

… Bye for now will return later once you are ready to sterilize my samples.

The space lobby is strong - & so are

farmers and Department of Agriculture,

Audobon society (for birds)

fishermen, NOAA and Fish and Wildlife service

public health, and CDC

etc…

There is a reason ALL sample return studies say OTHER AGENCIES and the PUBLIC must be INVOLVED IN YOUR PLANS at an EARLY STAGE - and together they have far more votes in Congress.

This may happen in 2033, if NASA still have no scientifically credible plans.

This EIS will not stand up to the smallest amount of independent scrutiny and peer review.

Image shows frame from: (Solar Orbiter’s Earth flyby)

I am sure the other agencies will get involved at some point down the road.

I am doing this to try to ensure they get involved sooner rather than later.

Mainly I’m trying to get NASA to TALK to everyone else and hear their points of view - which will be best for everyone, NASA included.

IF THERE IS LIFE ON MARS IT MAY BE AS HARMLESS FOR EARTH AS DANDELIONS IN THE USA - MOST INTRODUCED SPECIES ARE - BUT SOME INTRODUCED SPECIES ARE HARMFUL LIKE THE AFRICAN LAND SNAIL - WE NEED TO KNOW NOT GUESS

Many introduced species are harmless, an example would be the dandelion in the USA, it doesn’t harm American ecosystems, it just adds to the biodiversity.

Although they may be tough to control in a traditional lawn, they are only listed as an invasive species in Alaska and Oregon. In most areas of the country there is a very low risk to pushing out native species and they provide no real damage to the ecosystem. In fact, they are an excellent food source for many of the native bees, insects and other wildlife.

(Native, Non-Native, Invasive - and Dandelions! )

Text on graphic: If Mars has native microbial life, it may well be harmless to Earth like dandelions in most of the USA:

… no real damage to the ecosystem. In fact, they are an excellent food source for many of the native bees, insects and other wildlife.”

But they could be pests for agriculture like the Giant African Snail - or harmful to humans or the environment - we need to know, not guess.

(Dandelion - Dent-de-lion ou pissenlit)

(Snail in Ubud, Bali, 2010)

MIcrobes from Mars COULD be just as harmless as the dandelion, or at most a minor nuisance, indeed maybe most or even all would be. But as we’ll see, in some worst case scenarios, we could find microbes on Mars just as invasive and destructive of agricultural crops or ecosystems as the African snail and other invasive species on Earth.

There is no shortcut to Carl Sagan’s “vigorous program of unmanned Martian exobiology”.

Carl Sagan: Because of the danger of back-contamination of Earth, I firmly believe that manned landings on Mars should be postponed until the beginning of the next century, after a vigorous program of unmanned Martian exobiology and terrestrial epidemiology.

(, The Cosmic Connection – an Extraterrestrial Perspective )

This hasn’t happened. We haven’t sent anything to Mars to search for life since the Viking missions in the 1970s.

John Rummel’s image that, the rover could be headed for a bureaucratic "train wreck" (With planetary protection office up for grabs, scientists rail against limits to Mars exploration) brought to mind the iceberg that sunk the Titanic. Here the iceberg represents public and scientific opinion in 2033 when they find out that

NASA hasn’t prepared scientifically credible plans to protect Earth and
the samples they return will be valueless for the past life searches (and probably for present-day life too) because of the

8.1 ppb forward contamination by terrestrial organics, 0.7 per biosignature and
≪ 0.1 ppb of recognizable past organics in even recently exposed surface organics on Mars after degradation by ionizing radiation

Text on graphic: What we need to prevent in 2033 - NASA’s mission plans - NASA’s future science credibility - Public and scientific opinion

(Stöwer Titanic)

Text on graphic: Worst case for NASA, samples have to fly past Earth in 2033 without landing

… Bye for now will return later once you are ready to sterilize my samples.

The space lobby is strong - & so are

farmers and Department of Agriculture,

Audobon society (for birds)

fishermen, NOAA and Fish and Wildlife service

public health, and CDC

etc…

There is a reason ALL sample return studies say OTHER AGENCIES and the PUBLIC must be INVOLVED IN YOUR PLANS at an EARLY STAGE - and together they have far more votes in Congress.

This may happen in 2033, if NASA still have no scientifically credible plans.

This EIS will not stand up to the smallest amount of independent scrutiny and peer review.

Image shows frame from: (Solar Orbiter’s Earth flyby)

As a member of the public, not attached to any academic body, sometimes I feel like a gnat trying to draw the attention of the pilot of the Titanic to the iceberg.

But the iceberg of future public and scientific opinion is there whether the captain notices it or not.

I do have an advantage however. I can just say things as they are plainly and simply more easily. Writing this as an individual is far simpler than it would be if I was a tenured professor or researcher in an institution.

THIS RESEARCH EFFORT CAN’T SUCCEED WITHOUT “BROAD ACCEPTANCE AT BOTH LAY PUBLIC AND SCIENTIFIC LEVELS” - JOHN RUMMEL, FIRST NASA PLANETARY PROTECTION OFFICER

This is how John Rummel, NASA’s first planetary protection officer, put it in 2002:

“Broad acceptance at both lay public and scientific levels is essential to the overall success of this research effort.”

(A draft test protocol for detecting possible biohazards in Martian samples returned to Earth: 96)

This doesn’t look like broad acceptance of NASA’s proposed action. It may be stopped at various points.

BEST OUTCOME - NASA WITHDRAWS THE EIS, AND AT THEIR LEISURE DOES THE SIZE LIMIT REVIEW - DOES A NEW EXTENSIVE MARS SAMPLE RETURN STUDY - RESTORES THE INTERAGENCY PANEL AND DOES THE EIS PROPERLY - OR FINDS AN ALTERNATIVE LIKE MY SUGGESTION THAT RETURNS ONLY STERILIZED SAMPLES TO EARTH

This is what I’m hoping for as the best outcome for NASA. If they withdraw the EIS they then have many options

do the size limit review, do a new sample return study, and do a scientifically rigorous EIS., OR
sterilize the samples before returned to Earth, a far simpler process, OR
return unsterilized samples to a telerobotic facility in space such as my suggestion of a miniature telerobotic satellite above GEO.

There are probably many other options too.

This seems far the best outcome for NASA. Not forced to do anything by a court decision. Not responding to public panic. They can decide in their own time how to proceed. This is my hope and why I am writing this open letter.

At their leisure, NASA can then work on a 100% safe mission using sterilize first, or they can work on other ideas, but it’s all done in coordination with the general public, legal experts, ethicists, social scientists etc.

But if this doesn’t work out, then they will be stopped at some later point, I’m sure of that.

THE EIS MAY BE STOPPED BY OTHER AGENCIES IF ANY OF THEM LOOK BEYOND THE CONCLUSION “THAT THE POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS WOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT”

Assuming NASA continue with the EIS, it could be stopped by other agencies. However, as it is currently, the draft EIS says there would be no significant environmental effects, so they’d have no reason to look at it closely

… support the judgement that the potential environmental impacts would not be significant.

(Mars Sample Return DRAFT EIS : 3-16):

However if any other agencies do look at it more closely they’d see many issues with the citing and sources and see that that statement is not scientifically credible, that we don’t KNOW it would have no environmental or public health impacts or even large scale impacts, and may stop it.

OR IT CAN BE STOPPED BY A COURT CASE AFTER THE EIS IS FINISHED AND PUBLISHED - ANYONE WHO TOOK PART IN PUBLIC COMMENTS HAS STANDING TO DO THIS - PROBABLY WITH HELP OF ONE OF THE LARGE ORGANIZATIONS THAT FREQUENTLY CHALLENGE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

The next point it can be stopped is in a court case after the EIS is finished and published. There is no provision for legal challenges within NEPA, so it is done through judicial review, usually on the basis that:

the agency failed to consider some of the impacts
the agency failed to properly consider the weight of the impacts under review

They can only be taken to the courts by someone with “standing”. For this, they need to take part in the public comments or debate in the NEPA process, and need to be directly affected by the proposed action. There are many members of the public who have standing in this sense. (National Environmental Policy Act: Judicial Review and Remedies)

THE USUAL WAY TO BLOCK SIMILAR ACTIONS IS TO USE THE ARGUMENT THAT NOBODY HAS STANDING BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL EQUALLY AFFECTED - SUCCEEDS PERHAPS HALF THE TIME - BUT THIS WOULD BE A HUGELY DAMAGING ARGUMENT FOR NASA TO USE

There you have to show that you are particularly affected by it, which is normally understood to mean more so than by others. If the petitioner claims NASA overlooked a worst case risk of global effects NASA could try to block it

on the basis that in their hypothetical scenario they wouldn’t be affected more than anyone else in the world and so don’t have standing.

In the past, environmental cases have gone either way based on subtle legal arguments about whether environmental effects give the petitioner “standing” for the case (Newly Imposed Limitations on Citizens' Right to Sue for Standing in a Procedural Rights Case).

However, the publicity would be hugely damaging for NASA if they used that legal argument to try to prevent legal scrutiny of their EIS.

REMEDIES WOULD LIKELY INCLUDE AN INJUNCTION TO STOP THE MISSION PLANS WHILE THE COURT CASE IS IN PROGRESS - AND THEN SOME EQUITABLE RELIEF SUCH AS A REQUIREMENT TO STERILIZE THE SAMPLES BEFORE THEY REACH EARETH

If it does get as far as the courts, the case is usually (National Environmental Policy Act: Judicial Review and Remedies : section: Remedies in NEPA Litigation)

referred back to the agency (such as NASA) for further proceedings

If that is all the court does, the agency can continue with the project while it does those proceedings.

However at this point the court can also order “equitable relief”

the court can order the agency to stop the project going ahead
order some other action (in this case perhaps order to sterilize the samples first?).

So if a case is taken out and it’s successful, that could lead to a justice asking NASA to either stop the mission or to use some other remedy such as to sterilize the samples first before they are returned to Earth.

IF NOT CHALLENGED OR ANY CHALLENGES FAIL - NEXT STEP IS THE PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE NSC-25 - WHICH REQUIRES THE PRESIDENT TO ORDER A REVIEW OF LARGE SCALE EFFECTS THAT COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED EVEN IF THE AGENCY FEELS CONFIDENT THAT SUCH ALLEGATIONS ARE FALSE

If nobody takes them to court or NASA successfully block the case so it never reaches the court, the next step is the presidential directive NSC-25, which requires a review of large scale effects that could be reasonably expected to result in allegations of major or protracted effects. It has to be done even if the agency feels confident such allegations are false ( Presidential Directive NSC-25: Scientific or Technological Experiments with Possible Large-Scale Adverse Environmental Effects and Launch of Nuclear Systems into Space):

This happens after the NEPA process is completed (Planetary Protection, Legal Ambiguity, and the Decision Making Process for Mars Sample Return).

WORST CASE FOR NASA AND FOR THE SCIENCE RETURN - THAT NOTHING IS DONE UNTIL 2033 AND THEN WITH MOUNTING PUBLIC CONCERN THEY HAVE TO ORDER THE SPACECRAFT RETURNING THE SAMPLES TO CONTINUE PAST EARTH FOR RETRIEVAL AND STERILIZATION LATER

If it gets past all those hurdles with little public awareness, it could be stopped at the last minute with samples already on their way back to Earth. At that point, if not before, experts would look at the published EIS and see it wasn’t scientifically credible.

Mounting global public concern could lead to Congress and the president acting to tell NASA to divert the mission away from Earth. A worst case here might be an infodemic about Mars life similar to the COVID infodemic, junk science, problems for NASA’s credibility, and issues with eventual return of even 100% safe sterilized samples.

This is what I want to avoid above all. Both for the public anxiety and also for the huge loss to science and to NASA’s credibility.

This is a lose lose lose scenario.

But Earth would still be safe. Just a huge waste of all the funds for the NASA mission leading to much less return than they hoped for.

AWKWARD POSITION WHERE THE LEADING AUTHORS ON PLANETARY PROTECTION AS NASA OR ESA EMPLOYEES OR EX EMPLOYEES CAN’T BE EXPECTED TO WRITE A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THEIR OWN AGENCIES

In particular we are currently in the awkward position where due to NASA’s previous excellence in planetary protection, the authors who have written most extensively on planetary protection are previous employees of NASA or in some way connected to NASA or ESA.

There are many other authors you would expect to write a paper on this topic of the need for NASA to take more care over planetary protection. Sagan and Lederberg sadly died. Gill Levin also passed away just before the process of NASA’s draft EIS started.

However there are many still alive today who have written extensively on a Mars sample return.

But sadly many of those are former NASA or ESA planetary protection officers or employees. They are authors, co-authors or contributors for most of the recent substantial research on a Mars sample return. There doesn’t seem to be much awareness more widely at present.

The issue here is you can’t expect who has published research funded by NASA on this topic to publicly challenge their agency’s environmental impact statement, unless they were to go all the way to the dramatic move of whistleblowing. For example, John Rummel is author or co-author or contributor of much of the literature on the topic (. Curriculum Vitae). In the Space Studies Board planetary protection reviews he would be one of the “only two or three individuals with direct experience of the issue to be addressed”

(Review and Assessment of Planetary Protection Policy Development Processes : Page 77)

He was the obvious person to contact as your first planetary protection officer and as co-author of almost all the major studies on backward contaminationa. But as a former NASA planetary protection officer it’s no surprise he just deferred to the planetary protection office when I tried to contact him about it via email.

One NASA employee, Chester Everline, a JPL employee and a principal author of NASA’s probabilistic risk assessment guide . (Probabilistic risk assessment procedures guide for NASA managers and practitioners), made a detailed public comment in which he said

Chester Everline: A possible consequence of unsuccessful containment is an ecological catastrophe. Although such an occurrence is unlikely, NASA should at least be clear regarding what level of risk it is willing to assume (for the biosphere of the entire planet)

He said that when NASA set out the list of options to assess in the EIS it should have included the reasonable alternative to delay the return until the risks are better understood.

A better statement of options should include the possibility of delaying the return of Mars samples until the risks associated with their return are better understood

(Comment posted December 20th)

But there is no way he could liase with me on this topic. When I contacted him I well understood when he replied in a short one sentence email that as a JPL employee he couldn’t engage.

BUT WE CAN TURN THIS AROUND - WE CAN STEER THIS POTENTIAL TITANIC BACK TO THE CLEAR WATERS OF CREDIBLE SCIENCE

This is probably why it required someone not connected in any way to NASA to write this open letter and preprint.

Text on graphic: This open letter describes one of likely many ways NASA can change course and avoid driving directly into the bureaucratic “train wreck” of a forced flyby without landing in 2033 and then sterilization of all the samples.

(Photograph of the iceberg that likely sunk the Titanic)

(Titanic iceberg)

WHY I PROPOSED RETURNING THE SAMPLES TO AN UNMANNED SATELLITE - QUARANTINE CAN’T KEEP OUT LIFELONG SYMPTOMLESS CARRIERS LIKE TYPHOID MARY OR DISEASE OF CROPS OR MIRROR LIFE

Once the issue is raised of possible pathogens of humans, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the USA is sure to declare an interest for questions of quarantine. The WHO is likely to declare an interest at an international level (. Updating Planetary Protection Considerations and Policies for Mars Sample Return. ).

These experts on infectious diseases are sure to raise the issue of a lifelong symptomless carrier / superspeader of an unknown pathogen. The best known example, which any infectious disease expert will know about, is Typhoid Mary, who had to be isolated through to her death because she was a spreader of typhoid, but never showed any symptoms of typhoid herself (. Mary Mallon: First Asymptomatic Carrier of Typhoid Fever). Quarantine periods are based on the body clearing the pathogen. But how do we know our bodies would clear a Martian pathogen ever?

No quarantine period can be long enough for a lifelong symptomless carrier, or indeed a life long or long term carrier with symptoms as with immunocompromised COVID patients (. Researchers tie severe immunosuppression to chronic COVID-19 and virus variants. ), or HIV patients. This may be a possibility for a novel pathogen based on a novel biochemistry, that our immune system doesn’t recognize as life, and so, can’t clear from the body.

Also, in a similar issue, quarantine can’t protect Earth from mirror life or indeed fungal diseases, or other pathogens which are harmful to other plants or Earth’s biosphere but don’t harm humans. Two zinnia plants on the ISS died of a fungal disease fusarium oxysporum (, How Mold on Space Station Flowers is Helping Get Us to Mars) probably brought there on an astronaut’s microbiome (. Genomic Characterization and Virulence Potential of Two Fusarium oxysporum Isolates Cultured from the International Space Station. ).

: Mold growing on a Zinnia plant in the ISS. The mold fusarium oxysporum likely got to the ISS in the microbiome of an astronaut (. Genomic Characterization and Virulence Potential of Two Fusarium oxysporum Isolates Cultured from the International Space Station. ). Two of the four infected plants died (, How Mold on Space Station Flowers is Helping Get Us to Mars).
Human quarantine wouldn’t be a reliable method to keep a pathogen of terrestrial plants out of the terrestrial biosphere, at least until we know if there is life on Mars and what its capabilities are

SO WE HAVE TO RETURN ANY SAMPLES TO A TELEROBOTIC FACILITY NOT STAFFED BY HUMANS

So, at least until we know the scenario we face on Mars, we have to return bonus samples too, to a telerobotic facility. We can’t let humans anywhere near them unless we can be 100% sure there is no possibility of a lab leak.

But if we are returning it to a telerobotic facility - how about putting it in space and operating it from Earth?

This wouldn’t have been a realistic solution as recently as a couple of decades ago. But now, with the incredible minmiaturization of instruments and the fast improvements in telerobotics it is a very feasible solution.

This is also a far lower cost solution than a space station staffed by human technicians.

An unmanned satellite also lets us study martian life without the forward contamination in a human occupied space station, as ultramicrobacteria can get through HEPA filters both ways.

SO LET’S MINIATURIZE THAT TELEROBOTIC FACILITY AND PUT IT IN ORBIT AROUND EARTH USING ARTIFICIAL GRAVITIY IN A SMALL CENTRIFUGE SO WE DON’T NEED TO OPERATE THE INSTRUMENTS IN MICROGRAVITY (SUGGESTION)

The current mission plan involves opening the sample tubes in a BSL-4 and doing preliminary tests on them. The gases collected from the sample tubes would be looked at inside the BSL-4. So there would be limited instruments available anyway - whatever we can put inside the small BSL-4 lab. With the current NASA plan humans would operate them but once we have risk of large scale effects human quarantine doesn’t work if there is a lab accident. So they would need to be operated telerobotically anyway.

But we have instruments of extraordinary precision designed for sending to Mars to search for life in situ.

We would study the bonus samples using instruments already designed for in situ searches for life biosignatures and processes on Mars. We can use a centrifugue for artificial gravity so the instrments don’t need to be redesigned for microgravity.

In this way also we build up a capability in space to anlayse future samples returned from Mars and elsewhere in the solar system.

The dust and dirt samples are just a start. There is likely no shortcut alternative to Sagan’s (Sagan, 1973):

“exhaustive program of unmanned biological exploration of Mars”.

WE HAVE EXTRAORDINARY INSTRUMENTS DEVISED TO SEARCH FOR LIFE IN SITU ON MARS NEVER SENT THERE - ALL 7 OF THE TOP PRIORITY PRESENT-DAY LIFE EXPERIMENTS CAN ACTUALLY BE DONE IN SITU ON MARS - AND SO CAN ALSO BE DONE IN ORBIT

This orbiting astrobiology lab is the equivalent of one geostationary satellite far above GEO. Humans can study the dust, dirt and atmosphere as they would on Mars using exquisitely sensitive in situ instruments designed for end to end sample preparation to analysis – these already exist such as the

Life Marker Chip LDChip300 (antibodies) almost sent on Exomars but descoped which was able to discover a previously undetected microhabitat in the Atacama desert
(A microbial oasis in the hypersaline Atacama subsurface discovered by a life detector chip: implications for the search for life on Mars)
target mass of less than 1 kg (Life Marker Chip)
the gene sequencer SETG designed to do end to end sequencing on Mars with obviously no preparation on Earth. By 2016 it reached the capability to detect 10 ppb of DNA. It would be able to detect 400 highly conserved “universal genes” such as ribosomal DNA which would establish whether Martian life is related to terrestrial life, perhaps by meteorite transfer, or is independently evolved
(SETG: nucleic acid extraction and sequencing for in situ life detection on Mars)
astrobionibbler able to detect a single amino acid in a gram
(Searching for Organics in a Nibble of Soil )
(In Situ Microfluidic Subcritical Water Extraction of Amino Acids)
a chiral version of the Viking labelled release experiment
(A Chiral Labelled Release Instrument for In Situ Detection of Extant Life)
An off-axis holographic microscope to let the focus be adjusted after the image is taken making it easier to image individual microbes in a liquid medium
(A submersible, off-axis holographic microscope for detection of microbial motility and morphology in aqueous and icy environments)
A method to check for redox reactions directly by measuring the electrons and protons they liberate. This is sensitive to small numbers of microbes and has the advantage that it could detect life even if not based on carbon or any form of conventional chemistry we know of
. Microbial fuel cells applied to the metabolically based detection of extraterrestrial life.
A miniature variable pressure electron microscope that combines imaging with in situ chemical analysis
. Miniature variable pressure scanning electron microscope for in-situ imaging & chemical analysis.

Several instruments suggested for Europa:

Tests for autofluoescence. Aromatic amino acids (incorporating a ring of six carbons) fluoresce when stimulated with deep UV at wavelengths less than 250 nm. Chlorophyll and some other biological organics also autofluoresce
We could also use fluorescent dyes that bond to specific macromolecules such as lipids, proteins and nucleic acids
We can also use this autofluorescence to directly search for the activity of swimming microbes
Raman microspectroscopy synchronized with visible light can do a chemical analysis of the microbes directly
Superresolution optical microscopy, which can go beyond the usual optical resolution limit of 200 nm to observe nanobacteria

(Report of the Europa Lander Science Definition Team)

So we are not in reality restricted to terrestrial labs. We can do all these experiments in situ on Mars with the advantage that the life is in its natural habitat or only recently removed from it - some microbes might die on the 6 months journeyu to Earth in darkness in a sample tube at low temperatures.

Astrobiologists are keen to send these missions to Mars but they seldom get selected and are always later descoped when they do. The main issue is that thye are not tested in space. So we can test them in space in this small satellite above GEO first, searching for life in the samples. Then we can use them in Mars in the future. Meanwhile these are tiny instruments of a mass of order single digit kilograms typically with modern technology - and we could send hundreds of them in a ton of equipment. We could send far larger instruments to a satellite above GEO.

STERILIZING SAMPLES IN SPACE ELIMINATES ISSUES OF PUBLIC OPPOSITION - WITH VIRTUALLY NO IMPACT ON SCIENTIFIC RETURN - AND SAVES ON UPFRONT COSTS IN THE 2020S

Sterilizing the samples in situ eliminates the risk of the general public being opposed and conspiracy theories. It also eliminates the issue of the presidential directive on large-scale effects or legal challenges to the EIS.

Also it removes the need for a heavy aeroshell, so it may have almost no difference on the return mission costs.

It saves on the cost of a sample-receiving facility. However this may not be large compared to the total budget.

In 2009 this was estimated at $121 million in real world dollars based on the 1999 requirements (Planning considerations for a Mars sample receiving facility: Summary and interpretation of three design studies : table 2).

However, this comes from a time when the idea was to test the samples in animals. Safety testing in terrestrial organisms is now not thought to be feasible. They say.

If a future version of the test protocol eliminates this requirement in accordance with state-of-the-art practices and refinements at the time the final protocol is implemented, the SRF design would potentially be simpler.

(Planning considerations for a Mars sample receiving facility: Summary and interpretation of three design studies : page 756)

Also, as we saw, it has likely virtually no impact on science return.

WE CAN ENHANCE THE MISSION WITH BONUS SAMPLES COLLECTED WITHOUT FORWARD CONTAMINATION IN A CLEAN CONTAINER SENT IN THE ESA FETCH ROVER AND RETURN THEM TO A SMALL CENTRIFUGE MARS SIMULATION CHAMBER ABOVE GEO

I also make suggestions for a way to greatly increase the science return by returning samples of the surface dust, dirt, atmosphere, and pebbles in a CLEAN container sent there in the ESF fetch rover.

This would be returned not to Earth but for remote study in the same satellite above GEO that we have for sterilizing the Perseverance samples.

We would study the bonus samples using instruments already designed for in situ searches for life biosignatures and processes on Mars. In this way also we build up a capability in space to anlayse future samples returned from Mars and elsewhere in the solar system.

This would be minimal cost for NASA as the instruments would be funded by universities.

Humans go nowhere near the satellite (human quarantine can’t keep out mirror life or fungal pathogens of crops or fungal diseases that only affect some people).

We can return subsamples of the dirt, dust, and pebbles to Earth but we would do 100% sterilization of those samples.

We would study unsterilized samples in a safe orbit above GEO until we understand what’s in the samples very well, then it is for us to assess whether to continue to keep them in orbit. It may take multiple missions to Mars before we understand it well enough to be sure that samples can be returned unsterilized.

We do need to be prepared for the possibility of a discovery of great interest, such as mirror life, that would mean we can NEVER return uncontained unsterilized samples to Earth. That is why we do all this. Because there is a significant, likely small possibility that Earth DOES need to be protected.

THIS MAINTAINS NASA’S POSITION AS A WORLD LEADER IN PLANETARY PROTECTION AND AS A PIONEER MAKING NEW DISCOVERIES ABOUT OUR SOLAR SYSTEM AND THE ORIGINS OF LIFE

In this way you can move forward from this EIS with a new approach that would

retain your world-leading role in planetary protection,
be an excellent example that’s easy for other space agencies and private space to follow to keep Earth 100% safe
has less upfront cost this decade
adds the cost of a small satellite in a safe orbit above GEO in the 2030s (when launch cost to GEO will likely be greatly reduced)
with a suggestion for small bonus samples gathered by the ESF rover in a clean container that would greatly enhance the science return for astrobiology.

MANY MORE DETAILS SEE THE OPEN LETTER AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Preprint:

NASA must protect Earth's biosphere even if Mars samples hold mirror life – motivating planetary protection with new scenarios like mirror life - survey of recent research relevant to a Mars sample return - and how to keep Earth's biosphere 100% safe with a miniature telerobotic lab above GEO, and protect other biospheres 100% with sterile robotic explorers

Author: Robert Walker, contact email robert@robertinventor.com